Abstract: This chapter examines the land rights of Indigenous peoples in the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand from the perspective of the common law. Topics discussed are sources, content and proof of these rights, as well as ways in which they can be extinguished and infringed. The connection between land rights and self-government of Indigenous peoples is also considered. The chapter takes a critical and comparative approach, pointing out both positive and negative aspects of the judicial treatment of land rights in each of these common law jurisdictions.
I. INTRODUCTION
After the so-called 'discovery' of the Americas by Christopher Columbus in 1492, the dominant powers of Europe participated in a competitive rush for colonies that eventually encompassed most of the world. The initial preeminence of Spain and Portugal in this colonial enterprise was later overtaken by the ascent of France and Great Britain, with Britain emerging as the dominant empire-builder at the end of the Seven-Years War in 1763. After World War II, this process was reversed by the decolonization of much of Asia and Africa, where former colonies became independent and joined the international community as nation-states. In other parts of the world, colonies generally known as 'settler colonies' also achieved independence. In these former colonies, European settlers had arrived and reproduced in such numbers that they became the majority of the population. Achievement of nation-state status by these colonies did not result in restoration of the independence of the Indigenous peoples who lived there when the Europeans arrived. Instead, the European settlers remained in control after asserting independence from their mother country. In some cases, this was the result of unilateral assertion, as occurred when the Thirteen Colonies in British North America rebelled in the 1770s and created the United States of America. In other instances, there was a gradual evolution from colonial status to independent nationstate: Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are the leading examples from the British Empire. European legal systems -including the law of nations (now international law) developed in Europe to regulate relations among nationstates -distinguish between sovereignty and property rights. Sovereignty involves the exercise of governmental authority over a territory by a polity that asserts and maintains (in principle, if not always in practice) its independence. Externally, sovereignty includes the capacity to enter into relations with other polities that exercise sovereignty over other territories. Internally, it can be equated with jurisdiction, or the authority to make and enforce laws and government policies. Property rights, on the other hand, involve rights in relation to things (corporeal and incorporeal), including land, that arise under and are regulated by domestic laws that generally originate from either practice (customary law) or enactment (positive law). This distinction is vitally important in colonial contexts because acquisition of sovereignty by a colonizing European power did not necessarily entail acquisition of proprietary land rights. 6 When the European colonizers arrived in North America, they claimed sovereignty vis-à-vis other European powers. But they also entered into treaties with Indigenous nations, some of which acknowledged the sovereignty of those nations. 7 Other North American treaties involved acquisition of property rights in land, and so were admissions by the Europeans that the Indigenous peoples had such rights.
version of the Treaty) and land rights of the Māori. 9 Nonetheless, the British Crown claimed that its own acquisition of sovereignty over a territory included underlying title to all the land, and courts have consistently upheld this claim. 10 The same rule has been applied in Australia, where no treaties have been acknowledged and there was no judicial recognition of Indigenous land rights (apart from statute) until 1992. 11 This chapter focuses on the common law land rights of the Indigenous peoples in the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. These former settler colonies share a common British heritage, and all have legal systems that are based on English law. Despite these commonalities, the law in relation to Indigenous land rights has developed in distinctive ways in each of these jurisdictions. The connection between land rights and Indigenous sovereignty has also been dealt with differently. As already mentioned, American law recognized early on that land rights and internal sovereignty are both aspects of Indigenous territorial rights, while the other three jurisdictions have been reluctant to acknowledge this connection.
The discussion is structured thematically rather than geographically. Topics covered are the sources, content and proof of Indigenous land rights, and the ways in which they can be extinguished and infringed. The focus is on judicial treatment of these matters, rather than on legislation and negotiated agreements. 12 Comparisons of the law in 9 See Jacinta Ruru's chapter, and C Orange, (Penguin Books, 1995) . On statutory land rights, which will not be dealt with here, see Jennifer Clarke's chapter.
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For statutory and agreement-based rights, see chapters by Jennifer Clarke, Shin Imai, Benjamin J Richardson and Jacinta Ruru. Resolution of land claims is dealt with in Michael Coyle's chapter.
the four jurisdictions under consideration are undertaken in relation to each of the topics covered. While this comparative analysis is meant to be critical, it nonetheless examines these matters from the perspective of the dominant legal system in each jurisdiction, which is based on English common law. I realize that this involves making a choice of law. This is not intended to reflect negatively on the relevance or validity of Indigenous legal systems. 13 Instead, it is an acknowledgement of the limitations of my own knowledge and expertise as a non-Indigenous academic, and of the fact that, with the exception of tribal and peacemaker courts in the United States, the law of Indigenous rights has been formulated and applied primarily by common law courts.
II. SOURCES OF INDIGENOUS LAND RIGHTS
While the existence of Indigenous land rights has long been acknowledged by governments and courts in the United States, Canada and New Zealand, and more recently in Australia, the sources of these rights have not always been clear. One possibility is that these rights arise from the Indigenous legal systems that were in place when the European colonizers arrived. According to established principles of British colonial and international law, when the Crown acquired sovereignty over a territory the land rights of the local peoples under their own systems of law continued, and became enforceable in common law courts, through what is known as the doctrine of continuity.
14 A second possibility is that the common law itself acknowledged that use and occupation of land by Indigenous peoples at the time of Crown acquisition of sovereignty gave rise to real property 13 See chapters by John Borrows and Christine Zuni Cruz, and Borrows' book, Municipal and International Law (Cambridge University Press, 1967) vol I, 237-50. rights. 15 This alternative should be available to any Indigenous occupants, whether or not they had land rights under their own pre-existing systems of law. 16 Thirdly, Indigenous land rights may have been based on the law of nations, as applied by domestic courts. A fourth possibility is that Indigenous land rights arose after Crown acquisition of sovereignty, through a positive act of creation by the Crown or a legislative body.
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In North America, the British Crown purchased Indigenous lands by treaty, a practice that was formalized by the Although I think that it is clear that Indian title in British Columbia cannot owe its origin to the Proclamation of 1763, the fact is that when the settlers came, the Indians were there, organized in societies and occupying the land as their forefathers had done for centuries. This is what Indian title means….
21
While this passage indicated that occupation of land can be a source of Indigenous land rights, the words 'organized in societies' implied a further requirement.
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The notion that any people could exist without being socially organized attracted considerable criticism, 23 He went on to explain that there are two ways in which prior occupation is relevant. First, in the common law physical occupation is proof of possession, which in turn grounds title. He thus accepted the second potential source we identified earlier. 26 But he also suggested another 'source for aboriginal title -the relationship between common law and pre-existing systems of aboriginal law'. 27 However, he does not seem to have meant by this that Aboriginal title is derived from Aboriginal law and the application of the doctrine of continuity. Instead, when elaborating on proof of Aboriginal title, he clarified that both physical occupation and Aboriginal law can be relied upon to establish the exclusive occupation at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty that is necessary to prove title. Moreover, as discussed in more detail below, he regarded Aboriginal title as a generic right that does not vary from one Aboriginal group to another, as it would if it were based on the continuation of rights under vastly different systems of Aboriginal law. 28 However, it is nonetheless conceivable that the Chief Justice meant to leave the door open for Indigenous peoples to claim title on the basis of their own laws, as an alternative to occupation-based title. America, the major European states all wanted to acquire as much of it as they could, but, to reduce conflicts among themselves, they all agreed 'that discovery gave title to the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all other European governments, which title might be consummated by possession'. 37 As a result, the pre-existing sovereignty and land rights of the Indian nations were reduced:
They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.
38
Indian title thus became a right of occupancy through application of what Marshall CJ considered to be an international principle, which he applied domestically. Indian law was not the source of this title, though in his view this law continued to apply internally within the Indian territories.
39
Marshall CJ's reliance on the law of nations rather than on the common law of property or Indigenous law reveals a fundamental difference between the United States and Canada. In American law, Indian title is not just a proprietary right to land. It really amounts to title to territory, which includes governmental authority as well as land rights. So the Indian nations have retained residual sovereignty over their territories 37 Johnson, above n 35, 573. Marshall CJ undoubtedly got this wrong, as there was no agreement among European nations during the colonial period on the requirements for obtaining territorial sovereignty in the Americas: see MF Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in International Law (Longmans, Green and Co, 1926) 184-86, 204-30. 45 Mabo, above n 11, Order of the Court, 217.
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Moynihan J, the judge who made the factual findings, had 'found that there was apparently no concept of public or general community ownership among the people of Murray Island, all the land on Murray Island being regarded as belonging to individuals or groups': ibid, 22.
Justice Brennan included the following general statement about the source of native title that has become entrenched in Australian law:
Native title has its origin in and is given its content by the traditional laws acknowledged by and the traditional customs observed by the indigenous inhabitants of a territory.
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Despite the evident contradiction between this statement and the absence of traditional laws and customs supporting the communal title declared by the Court, 48 the Australian Parliament adopted Brennan J's statement in the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), 49 which was enacted to validate preexisting, non-Indigenous land rights and provide a mechanism for resolution of native title claims. Section 223 (1) In subsequent judgments, the High Court has relied upon this statutory definition, and required strict proof of Indigenous laws and customs supporting claimed land rights at the time of Crown acquisition of sovereignty, as well as proof that these laws and customs have been maintained up to the present day.
50
In New Zealand, Māori land rights were acknowledged by the British Crown in the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi, the English version of which guaranteed to the Māori 'the full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries and other properties'.
51 Judicial acknowledgement followed soon after, in the 1847 decision of the NZ Supreme Court in the Queen v Symonds. 52 In Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, 53 the Privy Council approved of the Symonds decision, and rejected a contrary opinion expressed by another New Zealand judge that 'there is no customary law of the Maoris of which the Courts of Law can take cognizance'. 54 On the contrary, the Privy Council said that the statutory regime put in place to integrate Māori title into the English landholding system 'plainly assumes the existence of a tenure of land under custom and usage'. The doctrine of continuity has thus been applied in New Zealand, but less rigidly than in Australia. 57 Māori land rights are sourced, not just in traditional laws and customs, but also in practice and usage, rendering bright-line distinctions between law/custom and practice/usage unnecessary. 58 This approach also avoids the problem that Indigenous claimants have faced in Australia of having to prove that they had a normative system prior to Crown acquisition of sovereignty that generated 'rights' cognizable to non-Indigenous Australian judges.
59

III. CONTENT OF INDIGENOUS LAND RIGHTS
Indigenous land rights are sui generis -they are different from other interests in land under the common law. There are also variations in the nature of these rights in each of the four jurisdictions under consideration here. These variations are largely due to the different sources of these rights examined in the previous section. The content of land rights rooted in occupation and use is not the same as content stemming from traditional laws and customs. The right of occupancy of the Indian nations in the United States also has unique features arising from American constitutionalism and the US Supreme Court's application of the doctrine of discovery.
In Canada, we have seen that the Supreme Court held in Delgamuukw that Aboriginal title arises from exclusive occupation of land at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty. At common law, exclusive occupation usually results in a fee simple estate, which, apart from Crown title, is the largest permissible interest in land. 60 However, given its unique source in occupation pre-dating Crown sovereignty, and other sui generis aspects (such as inalienability and communal nature, to be discussed below), the Court declined to equate Aboriginal title with a fee simple estate. But despite arguments by counsel for the Crown, the Court I have arrived at the conclusion that the content of aboriginal title can be summarized by two propositions: first, that aboriginal title encompasses the right to exclusive use and occupation of the land held pursuant to that title for a variety of purposes, which need not be aspects of those aboriginal practices, customs and traditions which are integral to distinctive aboriginal cultures; and second, that those protected uses must not be irreconcilable with the nature of the group's attachment to that land. 61 This means that Aboriginal title includes the natural resources on and under the land, including standing timber and oil and gas, regardless of whether the Aboriginal titleholders used these resources in the past. 62 It also means that they have the right to prevent third parties from trespassing on their land.
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Chief Justice Lamer's second proposition placed an inherent limit on the uses Aboriginal titleholders can make of their lands that was intended to preserve the land for future generations. Elaborating, he said that 'lands subject to aboriginal title cannot be put to such uses as may be irreconcilable with the nature of the occupation of that land and the relationship that the particular group has had with the land which together have given rise to aboriginal title in the first place'. 64 As examples of situations where this limit might apply, he suggested that Aboriginal titleholders might not be able to strip-mine their traditional hunting grounds or convert a ceremonial site into a parking lot.
Although well-intentioned, the inherent limit the Court placed on uses of Aboriginal title land was without precedent, and could seriously impede beneficial economic development by Aboriginal communities. It is also paternalistic, shifting authority to protect Aboriginal lands from 61 Delgamuukw, above n 10, para 117.
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Ibid, para 119-24; Tsilhqot'in Nation, above n 26, para 971-81. Delgamuukw, above n 10, para 128.
communities to Canadian judges. 65 Given the long history of exploitation of Aboriginal lands and removal of natural resources for the benefit of colonial interests, one has to wonder who is better placed to ensure the protection of these lands for future generations.
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In addition to this inherent limit and Aboriginal title's unique source in occupation prior to Crown sovereignty, Chief Justice Lamer identified two further sui generis aspects: inalienability and communal nature. 67 In each of the four jurisdictions under consideration, courts have consistently held that Aboriginal title cannot be sold or otherwise transferred to anyone other than the Crown, or, in the United States, the American government.
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This is a matter of both law and policy. 69 Various reasons have been given for this inalienability, including protection of Indigenous peoples from exploitation, incapacity of private persons to acquire title other than by government grant, and a need for government control of settlement. While each of these explanations has some validity, I think a more fundamental reason is that, unlike private property interests, Aboriginal title has jurisdictional dimensions that cannot be transferred to private persons, and so only another government can acquire the title. In Delgamuukw, the Supreme Court took a distinctly propriety approach to Aboriginal title, without explicitly considering its jurisdictional dimensions. Although the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en peoples who brought the action had asked the Court for a declaration of their right of self-government as well as of their title, the Court regarded self-government as a separate matter, and decided not to deal with it directly. 71 where title is held communally by an Aboriginal group that has decisionmaking authority, there must be a political structure for exercising that authority. In other words, communal title and decision-making authority necessitate self-government, at least in relation to Aboriginal title land.
75
Before discussing the other three jurisdictions, mention needs to be made of the content of Aboriginal land rights in Canada apart from title. In a number of cases, the Supreme Court has held that Aboriginal peoples can have site-specific rights to harvest resources, even though they do not have title to the land itself. 76 In Sappier and Gray, 77 for example, the Court held that the Maliseet and Mi'kmaq peoples in New Brunswick have an Aboriginal right to harvest wood for domestic purposes, such as constructing houses and making furniture for themselves. The content of these resource-use rights is determined by practices, customs and traditions that were integral to the distinctive culture of the people in question at the time of contact with Europeans. Indian sovereignty. In the two Cherokee Nation cases in the early 1830s,
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Chief Justice Marshall affirmed that, after European colonization and subsequent incorporation of their territories into the United States, the Indian nations retained not only their lands, but also their internal sovereignty. Indian title therefore has jurisdictional dimensions that make it more akin to title to territory than to title to land: Indian nations exercise jurisdiction over their tribal lands in the same way other sovereigns exercise jurisdiction over lands within their territories. 81 It follows that Indian nations have a plenary, collective interest in their lands that includes all surface and subsurface rights. 82 Moreover, in exercising their sovereignty they can make laws providing for the creation of individual and other property rights within their territories, but the restriction on alienation mentioned above prevents them from selling their lands so that they would be removed from their territory and hence their jurisdiction, unless the purchaser is the United States.
83 Furthermore, unlike Aboriginal title in Canada, Indian title is not subject to an inherent limit restricting the uses Indian nations can make of their lands.
The US Supreme Court's jurisdictional approach to Indian land rights has had a down-side for the Indian nations. In Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v See US v Shoshone Tribe, 304 US 111, 115-18 (1938); US v Klamath and Moadoc Tribes, 304 US 119, 122-23 (1938) 88 Justice Reed, in his majority judgment, remarked that the TeeHit-Ton claim 'was more a claim of sovereignty than of ownership'. 89 As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, sovereignty is distinct from property, and numerous decisions of the Supreme Court have held that Indian sovereignty is subject to the plenary power of Congress.
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Nonetheless, it is more in keeping with the territorial nature of Indian rights, and with earlier American case law, to regard these rights as both jurisdictional and proprietary. In Australia, reliance on traditional laws and customs and the doctrine of continuity has had a very negative impact on Indigenous land rights.
92 Contrary to the all-encompassing native title of the Miriam People declared by the High Court in Mabo, in subsequent cases Indigenous claimants have had to prove rights in relation to land by reference to specific laws and customs at the time of Crown acquisition of sovereignty. The content of their rights is therefore defined by their laws and customs.
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So even if they were in exclusive occupation of land at that time, they would not, for example, have any rights to minerals if they did not have laws and customs in relation to those resources. 94 Post-Mabo, the High Court has thus taken a particularized approach to native title, treating it as a divisible bundle of rights, each arising from specific laws or customs. As a result, a right to take estuarine crocodiles is as much a native title right as a right to exclusive possession. 95 So Australian law contains no equivalent to the fundamental Canadian distinction between Aboriginal title and other Aboriginal land rights. Moreover, the High Court has adamantly refused to envisage continuation of rights other than in relation to land. The doctrine of continuity has therefore been applied selectively, eliminating the possibility of an Indigenous right of self-government. 96 On the positive side, this means that native title rights and interests can co-exist with nonexclusive third party interests, such as some pastoral leaseholds, though in the event of conflict the third party interests generally prevail.
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While the doctrine of continuity has also been applied in New Zealand, it has not had the negative impact seen in Australia. This is mainly because Māori land rights are based on tikanga Māori, encompassing both custom and usage. 98 100 Although the matter has not yet been conclusively decided, it appears that exclusive Māori interests include rights to standing timber and mineral resources, a conclusion that follows from their equivalence to fee simple.
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IV. PROOF OF INDIGENOUS LAND RIGHTS
When Indigenous peoples seek judicial acknowledgment of their land rights in the courts of the nation-states that have asserted sovereignty over them, they have the onus of proving their rights in accordance with tests and standards that are usually set by the judiciary.
102 These tests and standards vary from one jurisdiction to another, depending on the source of the title and other factors, but the burden of proof is always onerous. The difficulties Indigenous claimants face are compounded by the fact that their traditions were generally oral, and courts tend to place greater weight on written documents in determining historical issues arising beyond the limits of living memory.
The Supreme Court of Canada has acknowledged these difficulties, and has sought to alleviate them to some extent by directing trial judges to admit oral histories as evidence and to accord them appropriate weight. In Delgamuukw, for example, the Court overturned the trial judge's decision and ordered a new trial, in part because he had not given sufficient credence or weight to the oral histories of the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en 99 See DV Williams, 'Te Kooti Tango Whenua': The Native Land Court 1864 -1909 (Huia Publishers, 1999 , and Jacinta Ruru's chapter. 100 See Ngati Apa, above n 10, esp per Elias CJ, para 46; Young, above n 50, 167-200. claimants. After acknowledging that the hearsay rule, for example, could act as a barrier to the use of oral histories in court, Chief Justice Lamer stated that 'the laws of evidence must be adapted in order that this type of evidence can be accommodated and placed on an equal footing with the types of historical evidence that courts are familiar with, which largely consists of historical documents'. 103 Nonetheless, judges still retain considerable discretion regarding the weight to be given to any evidence, including oral histories. 104 Moreover, in Australia there appears to be an on-going tendency to give more weight to the written evidence of settlers than to the oral histories of Indigenous peoples.
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What Indigenous peoples actually have to prove to establish their land rights depends largely on the source of these rights. In Canada, where Aboriginal title is based on occupation, Aboriginal peoples have to prove that they were in exclusive occupation of the claimed land at the time of British assertion of sovereignty. 106 As discussed earlier, the requisite occupation can be established by proof of physical presence and use of the land, and by evidence of Aboriginal law. In Delgamuukw, Chief Justice Lamer explained:
... the source of aboriginal title appears to be grounded both in the common law and in the aboriginal perspective on land; the latter includes, but is not limited to, their systems Delgamuukw, above n 10, para 144.
of law. It follows that both should be taken into account in establishing the proof of occupancy.
107
Regarding physical occupation, Lamer CJ said it 'may be established in a variety of ways, ranging from the construction of dwellings through cultivation and enclosure of fields to regular use of definite tracts of land for hunting, fishing or otherwise exploiting its resources'. 108 Factors to consider in deciding whether the occupation was sufficient to establish title include 'the group's size, manner of life, material resources, and technological abilities, and the character of the lands claimed'.
109
Somewhat surprisingly, when the Supreme Court next considered proof of Aboriginal title in R v Marshall; R v Bernard, 110 Chief Justice McLachlin emphasized the importance of physical occupation, and virtually ignored the evidentiary role of Aboriginal law. She also seems to have raised the threshold for establishing occupation by deciding that proof of occupation of specific sites rather than of a broader territory is required.
111 She suggested as well that nomadic peoples may not have been in sufficient occupation of at least some of their territories to have title. In contrast, Justice LeBel (Fish J concurring), in a separate judgment concurring in result, thought the Chief Justice's physical occupation approach was 'too narrowly focused on common law concepts relating to property interests', and might preclude establishment of Aboriginal title by nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples. 112 Moreover, in his trial decision in the Tsilhqot'in Nation case in 2007, Justice Vickers of the BC Supreme Court found that Marshall and Bernard differed from the claim before him because in that case 'the persons accused both attempted to prove Aboriginal title at specific sites' to defend themselves against charges of violations of provincial forestry legislation, 113 Ildefonso, 513 F 2d 1383 , 1394 -95 (1975 Strong v US, 518 F 2d 556, 561-62 (1975, Ct Cl) Regarding the 'integral to the distinctive culture' aspect of the test, he clarified:
What is meant by 'culture' is really an inquiry into the precontact way of life of a particular aboriginal community, including their means of survival, their socialization methods, their legal systems, and, potentially, their trading habits. The use of the word 'distinctive' as a qualifier is meant to incorporate an element of aboriginal specificity. However, 'distinctive' does not mean 'distinct', and the notion of aboriginality must not be reduced to 'racialized stereotypes of Aboriginal peoples'.
122
On the basis of the evidence presented, the Supreme Court accordingly held that the Pabineau and Woodstock First Nations of the Mi'kmaq and Maliseet peoples have an Aboriginal right to harvest wood for domestic uses on Crown lands traditionally used by them for that purpose.
In the United States, there is no equivalent to the distinction between Indian title and other Indian land rights found in Aboriginal rights law in Canada. 123 The explanation appears to be that American courts have defined occupation more broadly, so that virtually any Indian use of lands can give rise to Aboriginal or Indian title. 124 As early as 1835, Justice Baldwin expressed the opinion of the Supreme Court that Indian
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Van der Peet, above n 30, para 46, 73.
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Powley, above n 31.
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Sappier and Gray, above n 29, para 33. occupation 'was considered with reference to their habits and modes of life; their hunting-grounds were as much in their actual possession as the cleared fields of the whites, and their rights to its exclusive enjoyment in their own way and for their own purposes were as much respected'.
125 So while Indian title, like Aboriginal title in Canada, is based on exclusive occupation, American courts have taken a distinctly territorial approach to its geographical extent. In Santa Fe Pacific Railroad, Justice Douglas said:
If it were established as a fact that the lands in question were, or were included in, the ancestral home of the Walapais in the sense that they constituted definable territory occupied exclusively by the Walapais (as distinguished from lands wandered over by many tribes), then the Walapais had 'Indian title'.
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The same territorial approach has been taken in other American cases, including decisions of the Court of Claims on appeals from the Indian Claims Commission, which had been established in 1946 to resolve outstanding Indian claims against the US government. 127 Even tribes described as 'nomadic' have been held to have Indian title to lands they used on a regular basis in accordance were their own ways of life.
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Moreover, title extends to 'seasonal or hunting areas over which the Indians had control even though those areas were only used intermittently '. 129 Another important distinction between Canadian and American law in relation to proof is that Indian claimants in the United States do not have to prove occupation of land at the time of British, or even American, Cl 184, 194 (1966 The time requirement, as a general rule, cannot be fixed at a specific number of years. It must be long enough to have allowed the Indians to transform the area into domestic territory [so that the court is not] 'creating aboriginal title in a tribe which itself played the role of conqueror but a few years before '. 131 This means that Indian nations could acquire title from one another (especially if by peaceful transfer) or by occupying vacant lands after American assertion of sovereignty, 132 and eases the burden of proof by shortening the timeframe for establishing the requisite occupation. 161 Ct Cl 189, 202, 205-7 (1963) control or dominion over the land is the dispositive criterion.
Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon v US, 177 Ct
Sac and Fox Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma v US,
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Proof of native title in Australia is another matter entirely. What is required is not evidence of exclusive occupation or control, but rather of a connection to the land through traditional laws and customs.
136 This requirement originated from Justice Brennan's judgment in Mabo. 137 As we have seen, it was given statutory force by incorporation into the definition of native title in section 223(1) of the Native Title Act 1993, 138 which, as interpreted by the High Court, makes it necessary for claimants to prove that they have maintained a connection with the land through substantially uninterrupted acknowledgement and observance of their laws and customs from the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty to the present. 139 This requirement make proof of native title especially difficult for Indigenous peoples in more populated areas whose connection to the land and observance of traditional laws and customs have been severely interfered with by settlers. Particularly disturbing is the pronouncement by the Full Federal Court in 2008 that the cause of loss of connection and observance is irrelevant. 140 Apparently, even illegal squatting -a historically common way of taking Indigenous land in Australia -could have resulted in loss of native title because it would have severed the necessary connection with the land.
The Australian High Court's approach to native title claims also necessitates proof of specific laws and customs relating to particular uses of lands and resources.
141 It is not enough for claimants to establish they had, and have maintained, a general system of traditional laws and customs in relation to land; instead, they have to prove that their laws and customs provide specific 'rights' that are recognizable as such by common law courts.
142 So, unlike in Canada where historical practices alone can generate rights, Australian law requires proof that practices were engaged in pursuant to traditional laws and customs.
143 Moreover, as mentioned previously, in Australia proof of exclusive occupation does not necessarily result in all-inclusive rights to surface and subsurface resources.
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While New Zealand has also based Māori land rights on preexisting laws and customs, this has not had the negative consequences that reliance on traditional laws and customs has had in Australia. This is because Māori land rights are more broadly grounded in tikanga Māori, which includes both custom and usage.
145 Proof of Māori land rights therefore involves proof of custom or usage in relation to the claimed land at the time of British assertion of sovereignty in 1840. If the claimant group proves exclusive occupation, they have title equivalent to an inalienable fee simple estate, whereas proof of customary rights or uses not amounting to exclusive occupation could result in more limited interests.
146 Moreover, unlike in Australia, it does not appear to be necessary in New Zealand to prove continuous observance of tikanga Māori from the time of British assertion of sovereignty to the present.
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As in Canada, where title has been established as of that time, apparently it is presumed to continue until shown to have been extinguished. 
V. EXTINGUISHMENT AND INFRINGEMENT OF INDIGENOUS LAND RIGHTS
In all four jurisdictions considered in this chapter, Indigenous land rights can be voluntarily surrendered by means of a treaty or other agreement. In British North America, this was specified in the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which forbid private acquisition of Indian lands and stipulated that they could only be acquired by the Crown or a proprietary government at a public assembly of the Indian titleholders gathered for that purpose. 149 The Proclamation continued the pre-existing Crown practice of purchasing Indian lands, resulting in land-surrender treaties in what is now Canada from 1763 to the 1920s, when the Canadian government stopped negotiating treaties. The process recommenced in the 1970s when, following the Supreme Court of Canada's acknowledgment of the existence of Aboriginal title in Calder, 150 Canada established the comprehensive claims process. 151 In the 1990s, a similar process was created in British Columbia when the BC Treaty Commission was set up to facilitate the negotiation of land claims in that province. accorded to the government for the purpose of farming. 154 Questions have also been raised over whether Aboriginal peoples had the authority under their own systems of law to alienate their lands. 155 In the modern-day treaty process, extinguishment of rights has been vigorously opposed by Aboriginal peoples, and compromises have been sought to affirm existing rights while meeting government demands for certainty.
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In the United States, the federal government continued the past, the United States could also extinguish Indian title by conquest, 160 though more commonly military force was used to compel Indian tribes to cede their lands to the government. 161 In theory, British common law restrictions on the authority of the Crown would have prevented the taking of Indigenous lands by conquest in Canada, Australia and New Zealand after Crown acquisition of sovereignty. In practice, however, legal constraints are not always effective: in Australia, Aboriginal peoples were often killed or driven from their lands by force, whereas in New Zealand the wars of the 1860s resulted in substantial loss of life and land. 162 Because Indigenous land rights were not acknowledged (apart from statute) in Australia prior to the Mabo decision in 1992, 163 no recognized land-surrender treaties or agreements were entered into there. The Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand confirmed rather than extinguished Māori land rights, though large areas of Māori land have been lost through conversion of those rights to common law interests and subsequent alienations. 164 In the absence of constitutional protections for Indigenous land rights, there are no domestic legal impediments to extinguishment or infringement of those rights by legislatures that have constitutional authority over them. 165 Legislative extinguishment has occurred relatively recently in Australia and New Zealand. By the Native Title Act 1993 (as amended), 166 the Australian Parliament validated some past acts, such as unilateral taking. 173 As both the taking and the denial of compensation are inconsistent with fundamental common law principles, 174 it appears that the High Court was driven by political considerations to favour the property rights and economic interests of non-Indigenous Australians over the pre-existing land rights of the Indigenous peoples.
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In Canada, Aboriginal land rights have two additional constitutional protections that prevent even legislative extinguishment and infringement in some instances. First, section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, placed 'Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians', within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Parliament of Canada.
176 As a result, the Supreme Court has held that the provinces have lacked the constitutional authority to extinguish Aboriginal title ever since Confederation in 1867.
177 While this should mean that the provinces also lack the authority to infringe Aboriginal title, 178 the Supreme Court has suggested otherwise, without adequately explaining how provincial legislatures can infringe rights that are within the core of the exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament. 179 More recently, however, the Court has held that treaty rights, which are also within the core of Parliament's exclusive section 91(24) jurisdiction, are immune from provincial laws that would infringe them. 180 Logically, Aboriginal title should have the same division-ofpowers protection. 181 The second protection accorded to Aboriginal land rights in Canada is found in section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, which recognized and affirmed the 'existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada'. 182 The Supreme Court has held that this provision prevents these rights from being unilaterally extinguished, even by Parliament. 183 So, since 1982, extinguishment can only occur (constitutional amendment aside) with the consent of the Aboriginal peoples concerned. The Court has nonetheless held that, despite section 35(1), Aboriginal and treaty rights, including land rights, can still be infringed, provided the test for justifiable infringement laid down in Sparrow has been met. 184 This test requires the government to prove two things: first, a valid legislative objective for the infringement that is substantial and compelling; and second, that the Crown's fiduciary obligations to the Aboriginal people in question have been respected. Depending on the circumstances, the second branch of the test can involve asking the following questions: 'whether there has been as little infringement as possible in order to effect the desired result; whether, in a situation of expropriation, fair compensation is available; and, whether the aboriginal group in question has been consulted with respect to the conservation measures being implemented'.
185 Since Sparrow, the consultation requirement has become a major factor in determining whether an infringement is justifiable. The Supreme Court has decided that governments must engage in consultation, and in appropriate situations accommodate Aboriginal interests, where Aboriginal rights, though not yet established, are asserted and supported by some evidence. 186 The scope of the consultation depends on the strength of the case supporting the rights and the seriousness of the infringement.
187
While government infringement of Aboriginal land rights is still possible in Canada, those rights nonetheless have much greater protection than Indigenous land rights in the United States, Australia and New Zealand. The addition of section 35(1) to the Canadian Constitution in 1982 took away the parliamentary equivalent of the plenary power that the US Congress still has over Indian tribes. Unilateral extinguishment has been barred, so that the kind of termination policy pursued by Congress in the 1950s cannot occur in Canada. 188 Nor can the Canadian Parliament enact provisions like those in the Native Title Act 1993 and the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 that have extinguished some land rights in Australia and New Zealand. Even parliamentary infringements of land rights have to be justified by a stringent test. The duty to consult and to accommodate asserted Aboriginal rights has also become an effective means for forcing governments to involve Aboriginal peoples in decision-making, especially in regard to resource development on their claimed territories. As consultation must take place with Aboriginal representatives who have the authority to act on behalf of their peoples, the process of consultation itself is an exercise of self-government, and a way for Aboriginal peoples to assert and establish government-to-government relationships. 185 Sparrow, above n 170, 1119. On this policy, see DL Fixico, Termination and Relocation: Federal Indian Policy, 1945 -1960 (University of New Mexico Press, 1986 , and Benjamin Richardson's chapter on US Indian Law.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This discussion has revealed that, despite their common British heritage and legal traditions, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand have developed divergent legal doctrines in relation to Indigenous land rights. Differences in the content and requirements for proof of these rights stem largely from differences in judicial opinion over their source.
In the United States and Canada, the courts have ruled that occupation is the source of Indigenous title, but the American approach has distinctly territorial and jurisdictional dimensions, whereas the Canadian approach is more narrowly proprietary. In the United States, Indian nations have both residual sovereignty and land rights in the territories occupied by them. By contrast, the Canadian Supreme Court has determined that Aboriginal title is a property right arising from occupation of land that is separate from governance rights. And yet the Court has acknowledged that Aboriginal nations have decision-making authority over their collectively-held lands, authority one Canadian judge has concluded is governmental in nature.
In Australia and New Zealand, the courts have decided that Indigenous land rights stem from the Indigenous legal systems that existed prior to British acquisition of sovereignty. Through the doctrine of continuity, these rights became enforceable in common law courts. Unfortunately, in applying this doctrine the Australian judiciary has required strict proof that traditional laws and customs confer specific rights, and that knowledge and observance of the laws and customs have continued up to the present. These requirements have narrowed the scope of claimable rights, and imposed impossible burdens of proof on some Indigenous claimants. In New Zealand, application of the doctrine of continuity has been less problematic, as land rights stem from tikanga Māori, broadly defined as including both custom and usage. Nor is proof of continuous observance of tikanga Māori necessary, except where required by statute.
The authority of non-Indigenous governments to extinguish or infringe Indigenous land rights is dependent on a nation-state's constitution. In the four jurisdictions examined here, these rights are most vulnerable to legislative extinguishment and infringement in New Zealand because the unicameral Parliament has sole authority over them. In the United States and Canada, exclusive federal jurisdiction over Indigenous affairs provides some protection against the states and provinces. In Australia, federalism also provides some protection against the states, to the extent that the Commonwealth Parliament legislates in favour of Indigenous land rights. Only in Canada are land rights generally protected against legislation by a specific constitutional provision. Ultimately, however, the fate of Indigenous rights depends on the vision of judges, the political will of legislators, and a belief within the larger community that justice requires that these rights be maintained and respected.
